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A Partial Defense of an Anti-Discrimination
Principle
Michael C. Dorf
Abstract
Over a quarter century ago, Professor Fiss proposed that the constitutional principle of equal
protection should be interpreted to prohibit laws or official practices that aggravate or perpetu-
ate the subordination of specially disadvantaged groups. Fiss thought that the anti-subordination
principle could more readily justify results he believed normatively attractive than could the rival,
anti-discrimination principle. In particular, anti-subordination would enable the courts to invali-
date facially neutral laws that have the effect of disadvantaging a subordinate group and also en-
able them to uphold facially race-based laws aimed at ameliorating the condition of a subordinate
group. Since Fiss’s landmark article appeared, Supreme Court doctrine has, at every turn, rejected
his anti-subordination principle in favor of a narrower, more formalistic anti-discrimination prin-
ciple. In the Court’s view, the equal protection guarantee primarily targets discrimination against
individuals on a small number of forbidden grounds. However, the anti-discrimination principle
as such should not be taxed with the Court’s adoption of equal protection hyper-formalism in
the name of anti-discrimination. Both anti-discrimination and anti-subordination are sufficiently
open-ended conceptions of equality to produce a variety of morally attractive and not-so-attractive
outcomes.
I. TwoConceptionsofEquality
What is the best interpretation of theEqualProtectionClause of the Fourteenth
Amendment?1  The Clause grew out of an American tradition honoring the general
principle of equality that goes at least as far back as Andrew Jackson,2 if not to the
Declaration of Independence, 3 or even the Mayflower Compact. 4  In an earlier age it
mighthavebeenpossibletoarguethattheClauserequiresonlythatthelaw,whateverits
content, be “equally binding upon every member of the com munity.”5  Yet, the time
when the meaning of “equal protection” could be separated from the meaning of
“equality” has long passed, if it ever existed.  Today, any convincing account of the
Equal Protection Clause must also be, at least in substantial part,  an account of the
generalconceptofequality.
At the conceptual level, however, equality is, if not entirely empty, 6 so hotly
contestedthatitcanbeinvokedwith(equal?)aplombbythoseoneithersideofourmost
divisive national questions: Does aff irmative action remedy or create inequality?  Is a
right toabortionnecessary for sexequalityoranathema to theequal right to lifeof the
unborn?Istheproscriptionofsomebutnotallcategoriesofdiscriminationincivilrights
statutes theparadig matic instanceof legally requiredequalityor theconferralofspecial
rights? Answers to such questions do not derive from the abstract concept of equality
but,atbest,frommoreparticularizedconceptionsofequalityandothernorms.
To what sources s hould a contemporary reader of the Constitution turn in
choosing an appropriate conception of equality?  After constitutional text, courts and
1
Exceptwhereotherwisenoted,inthises sayIusetheterm“equalprotectionclause”toinclude
theprincipleofequalprotectionapplicable to the federalgovernmentvia theFifthAmendment
DueProcessClause.SeeBollingv.Sharpe , 347U.S.497, 500(1954) .
2
 See Michael Les Benedict, Laissez -Faire and Liberty: A Reevaluation of the Meaning and
Origins of Laissez -Faire Constitutionalism, 3 Law and History Review 293 (1985); Howard
Gillman, The Constitution Besieged: The Rise and Demise of Lochner ERa Police Powers
Jurisprudence(1993).
3 Itma yseem difficult to takeseriously theDeclaration ’segalitarian languageinlightofitsco -
existencewithslavery. SeeScottvSanford,60U.S. (19How)393 ,410  (1857)  ( “theenslaved
Africanracewerenotintendedtobeincluded,andformednopartof thepeoplewhoframedand
adopted thisdeclaration”), although evenbefore theCivilWar therewere thosewhodid argue
that theDeclarationcould be takenasanapplying to allpersons.   See id.at574 -75 (Curtis,J.,
dissenting); Cf. FrederickDouglass, TheConstitution of theUnitedStates: Is It Pro -Slavery or
Anti-Slavery?,2LifeandWritingsofFrederickDouglass467 -80(P.Foner,ed.1950),reprinted
in Paul Brest & Sanford Levinson, Process of Const itutional Decisonmaking 207 -11 (3d ed.
1992)(argu ingthatslaverywasinconsistentwiththeante -bellumConstitution).
4 CompactMadeonBoard theMayFlower (Nov.11,1620), inContextsof theConstitution1
(NeilH.Cogen,ed.1999)( undertakingto “enactconstitute,andframe,suchjustandequalLaw s,
Ordinances,Acts,Constitutions,andOfficers, from time to time,asshallbe thoughtmostmeet
andconvenientforthegeneralGoodoftheColony”) .
5 Durkee v. Janesville, 28 Wis. 464, 470 (1871)  (approving the Tennessee Supreme Court’s
derivation of t his principle from the “law of the land” clause of the Tennessee Constitution)
(citingWally’sHeirsv.Kennedy,10Tenn.(2Yer.) 554(1831)) .
6
SeePeterWesten,TheEmptyIdeaofEquality,95Harv.L.Rev.537(1982) .
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scholarstypicallylisthistoryas thenextmostauthoritativesourceofguidance,buthere
too, theconventional approachprovidesscanthelp. Thereisgeneralagreementthat the
central,originalpurposeoftheEqualProtectionClause,indeed,oftheentireFourteenth
Amendment, was to protect African -Americans against the Black Codes (whether
directly or through Congressional legislation). 7  Yet today virtually no one thinks the
meaningoftheEqualProtectionClausecanberestrictedtoitsoriginalpurpose,narrowly
defined.  TheClause ismajestically inclusive in its language, not confined toAfrican -
Americans,inequalitiesbasedonrace,orevenunequaltreatmentamongcitizens.
Moreover, there isbroadconsensus that,whatever itsmerits inothercontexts,a
jurisprudenceofnarrowlydefinedoriginalunderstandingoftheEqualProtectionClause
is morally una cceptable because it would license such odious institutions as racially
segregated schools, anti -miscegenation laws, and the grossest forms of discrimination
againstwomen. Thisisnotjustaproblemforliberals. Whatevertheymaythinkintheir
hearto fhearts,conservativeswhoaregenerallysympathetictooriginalismcannotopenly
saythat Brownv.BoardofEducation 8 waswronglydecided. Accordingly,theyconcoct
implausible accounts of the Reconstruction -Era understanding of segregation. 9   And
thoseconservativeswhowishtopreservenotonlythedecisionsinvalidatingsegregation
butalsothoseinvalidatingmost formsofaffirmativeactionmustblindthemselveseven
further.  Strikingly, not a single Supreme Court opinion arguing for the
unconstitutionalityofrace -basedmeasuresaimedathelpingratherthanharmingAfrican -
Americans even attempts to reconcile that view with the Freedman’s Bureau and like
Reconstruction-Erainstitutions. 10
Thus,neitherliberalsnorconservativesarewillingtobeg uidedbythenineteenth -
century understanding of equal protection in its narrowest form.  And as soon as one
7
 See Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S.  (16Wall.) 36 , 67 -71 (1872);  Akhil Amar, The Supreme
Court,1999TermForeword:TheDocumentandtheDoctrine,114Harv.L.Rev.26,64(2000)
(“theFourteenthAmendmentframersclearlyaimedtoprohibit[BlackCodes]asaparadigmcase
of impermis sible legislation”);EricFoner,Reconstruction257 (1989);MichaelW.McConnell,
The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A Comment on Ronald Dworkin's “Moral
Reading” of theConstitution, 65 FordhamL.Rev. 1269, 1281 (1997) (“The clearest andmost
indisputable purposeoftheFourteenth Amendmentwastoprovideconstitutionalauthorityforthe
CivilRightsActof1866,whichoutlawedthe BlackCodes .”).
8
347U.S.483(1954).
9 See,e.g. ,MichaelW. McConnell,Originalismand theDesegrationDecisions,81Va.L.Rev.
947( 1995)( invoking Republicansupport inthe1870s forabill outlawingsegregatedschools as
evidence of the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment); s ee contra  Herbert
Hovenkamp, The Cultural Crises of the Fuller Court , 104 YALE L.J. 2309, 2337 -43 (1995)
(reviewing Owen M. Fiss, Troubled Beginning s of the Modern State, 1888 -1910 (1993))
(observing, interalia , that in itsday, theseparate -but-equaldoctrineofPlessyv.Ferguson,163
U.S. 537 (1896), was largely uncontested ); Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and
Constitutional Theory: A Res ponse to ProfessorMcConnell, 81 Va. L. Rev. 1881,  1884 -1914
(1995) (arguing that Brown contradicts the original understanding of the Fourteenth
Amendment); Earl M. Maltz, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions —A Response to
ProfessorMcConnell,13Co nst.Commentary 223,228 -31(1996) ( same).
10 See generally Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 Yale L.J. 427, 429 -32 (199 7); Eric
Schnapper, AffirmativeActionandtheLegislativeHistoryoftheFourteenthAmendment,71Va.
L.Rev.753,754 -83(1985).
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moves to a somewhat higher level of generality – but not one that is so general as to
providenorealguidance,like“equalprotectionmeanstreati ngpeoplewhoaresimilarly
situatedinthesameway” –thedisagreementovertheappropriateconceptionofequality
re-emerges.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has tended to favor a particular conception of
equality in its Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudenc e.  Defining the Clause as targeted
primarilyatdiscriminationagainst individualsonasmallnumberof forbiddengrounds,
the Court views it as a mandate of formal equality.  This conception stands in stark
contrast to theprinciple,elaboratedbyProfes sorFissoveraquartercenturyago,andat
thetimeaplausibledescriptionoftheCourt’sdoctrine,thattheEqualProtectionClause
prohibits laws or official practices that “aggravate[] (or perpetuate[]?) the subordinate
positionofaspeciallydisadva ntagedgroup.” 11 DespiteFiss’scontentionthatthegroup -
disadvantage principle could do a better job of accounting for the egalitarian
jurisprudence of theWarren Court than the anti -discrimination principle could, in the
yearssinceFisswrote Groupsan d theEqualProtectionClause , theCourthas,atevery
turn,chosenanti -discriminationovergroup -disadvantage.
Fissarguedthatnon -discriminatorygovernmentactionsoughttobeinvalidunder
the Equal Protection Clause when they directly disadvantage a subordinated racial
group.12  He explained that the group -disadvantage principle made sense of the
otherwise-problematicdecision in Shelley v.Kraemer .13   There is nodifficulty finding
unconstitutional stateaction inacase like Shelley,Fisscontended, ifonedoesnot treat
equal protection as co -extensive with the anti -discrimination principle.  The argument
wasaccordinglycriticaloftheCourt’sdecisionin MooseLodgeNo.107v.Irvis ,14notto
mention Millikenv.Bradley .15
CloselylinkedtoFiss’spr oposedreinterpretationofstateactiondoctrinewashis
contention that laws and policies that have a negatively disparate impact on a
traditionallydisadvantagedracialminorityare, ipsofacto ,unconstitutional,evenabsenta
showingof intentionaldisc rimination.16 He found some support for thisproposition in
then-currentprecedent,especiallycases interpretingstatutorynorms, 17buthismain line
of argument for this and other manifestations of his group -disadvantage principle was
straightforwardlyno rmative: thecentralcommandoftheEqualProtectionClauseisthat
the government shall not subordinate African -Americans or similar social groups,
regardlessofmotive.Currentdoctrinesquarelyrejectsthatview. 18
Fiss also contended that race -based g overnment programs that benefit
traditionallydisadvantagedgroups,andespecially those thatbenefitAfrican -Americans,
are generally valid because they do not relegate those personswho do not receive the
11
OwenM.Fiss,GroupsandtheEqualProtectionClause,5Phil.&Pub.Aff.107,157(1976).
12 Seeid. at136 -41.
13
334U.S.1(1948).
14
407U.S.163(1972).
15
418U.S.717(1974).Quiteliterally. Fissdidnotmention Milliken
16
Fiss ,supranote 11,at 157 -59.
17
Seeid.at 142n.55.
18
 SeeWashington v. Davis , 426U.S. 229 , 248  (1976)  (holding that facially neutral laws that
disparatelyimpactminoritiesdonot , absentmore , triggerheightenedscrutiny ).
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relevant benefit to a subordinate status. 19  In co ntrast, pursuant to a principle of
symmetry, theCourt has held that all racial classificationsmust be subject to the same
exactingscrutiny. 20
Finally,Fissconceded that theremaybe institutional reasonswhy thecourtsare
poorly positioned to enforce t he group -disadvantage principle.  All manner of
governmentactionsnotmotivatedbyrace –fromfundingofschools,transportation,and
health care to siting of locally undesirable land uses – can and do disadvantage
subordinated racial groups; yet it woul d be unmanageable for courts to assume
responsibility for all such occurrences.  Thus, Fiss allowed that the anti -discrimination
principlemight be justified as a judicially enforceable shadow of the Equal Protection
Clause.21  However, acting pursuant to S ection Five of the Fourteenth Amendment,
Congress would remain free, and perhaps would be obliged, to enforce the group -
disadvantageprinciple. 22 TheSupremeCourthasrejectedthisviewaswell,holdingthat
Congresshasnoauthoritytolegislateontheb asisofabroadersubstantiveunderstanding
thantheCourt’sown. 23
WastheCourtright toprefer theanti -discriminationprincipleoverFiss’sgroup -
disadvantage principle as the exclusive conception of the Equal Protection Clause?
Neither the text nor hi story of the FourteenthAmendment dictates one rather than the
otherprinciple. 24Perhaps,then,itisamistaketoseekacoherentoverarchingconception
of equality.  Courts might instead simply decide equal protection cases on an ad hoc
basis.Afteral l,theremaywellbenotheoryofequalprotectionthatisbothacceptableto
all of the Justices of the Supreme Court and explains all or evenmost of the Court’s
jurisprudence. Inthisview,incompletelytheorizedagreement,asa modusvivendi ,isall
thatonecanhopefor. 25
But such minimalism is, at best, an account of the outputs of a multi -member
institution like a legislature or court thatmust reach compromises among personswith
differentconvictions.  It ishardlyaprescriptionforhowan indiv idual judge, legislator,
orcitizenshouldthinkaboutthemeaningofequality –oranythingelse. Moreover, the
formal requirement that judges provide reasons for their decisions tends to produce
19
See Fiss,supranote 11,at129 -36.
20
See AdarandConstructors,Inc.v.Pena,515U.S.200,226(1995); CityofRichmondv.J.A.
Croson , Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1989) . The Court’s most recent pronouncement on this
subject indicates that strict scrutinymaynot alwaysbe fatalwhenapplied to affirmativeaction
programs.  See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519
(1980) (Marshall,J.,concurring)). The claimthatstrictscrutinyis“ ‘strict’intheoryandfatalin
fact,”wasfirstmade in Gerald Gunther,TheSupremeCourt,1971Term –Foreword:In Searchof
EvolvingDoctrine on a Changing Court: AModel for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L.
Rev.1,8(1972) ).
21
SeeFiss, supranote 11, at 175-76.
22
 See id.  For a ful ler elaboration of this idea, see LawrenceGene Sager, FairMeasure : The
LegalStatusofUnderenforcedConstitutionalNorms,91Harv.L.Rev.1212 ,1239 -42(1978) .
23
 See Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Kimel v.
FloridaBd.ofRegents,528U.S.62(2000).
24
 See Paul Brest, The Supreme Court 1975 Term, Foreword: In Defense of the Anti -
discrimination Principle, 90Harv. L.Rev. 1, 5 (1976) (“The text and history of the clause are
vagueandambiguous”).
25 SeegenerallyCassR.Sunstein,LegalReasoningandPoliticalConflict(1996).
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relatively abstract formulations of the equality principle , such as the Justices’ frequent
claimthatFourteenthAmendmentrightsbelongtoindividualpersons,notgroups. 26
Furthermore, with few exceptions, even minimalists are not nihilists. 27
Minimalists, along with virtually everyone else, accept that purposeful discrimination
againstmembersof a traditionally subordinategroup  on thebasisof race denies equal
protection. Andthisthenraisesthequestionofwhich,ifany,oftheitalicizedtermsare
essentialtosuchajudgment. Thatquestioncannotbeans weredexceptbyreferencetoa
substantiveconceptionofequality.
Tobesure,asomewhatdifferentsortofminimalistmightsay that the judicially
enforceable interpretation of theEqualProtectionClause should not extendbeyond the
core of consensus.  On such a view, racially neutral laws that have a disparate impact
would be valid absent an illicit subjective purpose, but so too would most forms of
affirmative action – a complete victory for neither the anti -discrimination principle nor
thegroup -disadvantageprinciple. Thecompetingconceptionswouldbattle itout in the
politicaldomain.
Whatever the attraction of such a conventionalist jurisprudence in other
contexts,28 it creates an enormous embarrassment where equality is concerned.  The
contemporary consensus that purposeful discrimination against members of a
traditionallysubordinategrouponthebasisofracedeniesequalprotectionisofrelatively
recent vintage.  Earl Warren’s appealing rhetoric in Brown notwithstanding, different
treatmento nthebasisofraceisnotinherentlyunequalinthesensethatasocietycannot
be conceived inwhich segregation connotes no subordinate status for one groupor the
other.29  Only by rejecting separate -but-equal in favor of some other conception of
equality(but -exactly-what-we-are-not-quite- sure),couldthe BrownCourtoverrule Plessy
v. Ferguson. 30   And thus the embarrassment: the now -widely-accepted principle that
purposeful discrimination against members of a traditionally subordinate group on the
basis of race denies equal protectionwas not at all amatter of consensuswhen Brown
was decided.  Accordingly, the conventionalist minimalist must say that Brown was
wrongly decided, even if it has become right by virtue of subsequent acceptance. One
canthi nk,asIdo,thatpublicacceptanceplaysasubstantialroleindeterminingthepath
of constitutional and other judge -made law, but making retrospective acceptance the
pivotonwhichturnsthecorrectnessofthedefiningdecisionofahalfcenturyisatl east
highlyproblematic.
26 See,e.g., Adarand Constructors,Inc.v.Pena,515U.S.200,22 7(1995) ; CityofRichmondv.J.
A.Croson,Co., 488U.S.469 ,493(1989) (quoting Shelleyv.Kraemer,334U.S.1,22(1948) ).
27 Indeed, while there are those who doubt the ability of courts to provide principled
interpretations of constitutional norms  such  as equality , see, e.g.,  Mark Tushnet, Taking the
Constitution Away From the Courts (1999) ; Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement  (1999) ,
eventheyargueforcefullyforsomeconceptionofequalityasapoliticalprinciple .
28
See HenryH.Wellington,InterpretingtheConstitution:TheSupremeCourt andtheProcessof
Adjudication 20-40 (1990),fora defenseofconventionalistjudicialreview.
29 As Charles Black explained, what made separate unequal was the social meaning of
segregation in the real world.  See Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation
Decisions,69YaleL.J.421(1960) .
30
163U.S.537(1896) .
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In any event, even conventionalism is itself a controversial conception of the
EqualProtectionClause (orperhapsofconstitutional interpretationmoregenerally), for
whichreasonscanappropriatelybedemanded.Theargumenttha tconventionalismbetter
respects democracy than either the anti -discrimination principle or the group -
disadvantageprincipleisjustthat,anargument.Ittakesnogreatimaginationtoenvision
conceptions of democracy in which even (indeed especially) w idely- approved
discriminatory or group -disadvantaging decisions provide the occasion for judicial
interferencewithmajoritariandecisionmaking.
II. WhichAnti -DiscriminationPrinciple?
GroupsandtheEqualProtectionClause didnot,however,directlygr applewith
thesejurisprudentialquestions. Atbottom,itwasresult -oriented. AlthoughFissgranted
thatthereweredifficultquestionsforanyconceptionofequality,itishardtoread Groups
andtheEqualProtectionClause withoutdrawingtheinferen cethatthemainvirtueofthe
group-disadvantage principle was its ability to produce certain answers that the anti -
discriminationprinciplecouldnotplausiblyproduce.
OnecouldcriticizeFiss’smethodologyasbackwards. Shouldnotconstitutional
principlesdetermineconcreteresults,ratherthanvice -versa?Butperhapsthiscriticismis
notaspotentasitfirstappears.Constitutionaladjudicationmightbethoughttostrivefor
areflectiveequilibriumbetween,ontheonehand,moral intuitionsabou tconcretecases
and,on theotherhand,avarietyof factors thatgo into the selectionofa conceptionof
some constitutional command.  The argument would then focus on the institutional
mechanismsformeasuringboththemoral intuitionsandthefactors ontheothersideof
thebalance.
InthebalanceofthisEssay,Iwanttoputthisinstitutionalquestionasideandask
whetherFisswasrightevenonhisownterms.Letusgrant arguendothat,evenstanding
byitself,thepatternofresultsreasonablyob tainableunderanyparticularconceptionofa
relatively open -ended constitutional provision is a legitimate basis for selecting one
rather than another interpretation.  Nonetheless, Fiss overstated the extent to which an
anti- discrimination principle natu rally leads to the conception of equality as formal
equality thathas characterized theSupremeCourt’s jurisprudenceover the last quarter -
century. Theconstitutionalityofneutrallawsthathaveadisparateimpactonaprotected
class, of affirmative ac tion, and of Congressional efforts to “enforce” a version of the
Fourteenth Amendment that differs from the one the courts enforce are all difficult
questions – but they are difficultwhether or not one accepts group -disadvantage, anti -
discrimination,ors omethingelseas thebestconceptionof theEqualProtectionClause.
Letustakethesequestionsinturn.
A.DisparateImpact
Should laws thathave a disparate impacton a traditionallydisadvantagedgroup
beunderstoodtotriggeranyspecialjudicials crutiny? Fissthoughtthattheyshould,and
thatthisunderstandingwasalogicalinterpretationoftheEqualProtectionClausebutnot
one that flowedoutof theanti -discriminationprinciple. 31 Yetwecansee that thevery
debate that Fiss characterized  as a struggle between  group -disadvantage and anti -
31
SeeFiss,supranote 11,at136 -46.
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discrimination re -emerges even if one accepts anti -discrimination as the appropriate
conceptionofequality.
Consider a statutoryprovision that is expresslywritten as an anti -discrimination
principle.  TitleVIoftheCivilRightsActof1964providesthatnopersonshall,“onthe
groundofrace,color,ornationalorigin,beexcludedfromparticipationin,bedeniedthe
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any [federally funded] program or
activity.”32In Alexanderv.Sandoval ,33a5 -4SupremeCourtruledthatthereisnoprivate
right of action to enforce a Department of Justice regulation prohibiting recipients of
federalfundsfromusingneutralcriteriathat“havetheeffectofsubject ingindividualsto
discriminationbecauseoftheirrace,color,ornationalorigin.” 34 Thecoreprohibitionof
TitleVI isonexpressorpurposefuldiscrimination, theCourt reasoned,andprohibition
of disparate impact was too far removed from that core t o permit the assumption that
Congressintendedtheretobeaprivaterightofactiontoenforcetheregulation. 35
Althoughthe Sandoval majorityassertedthatitis“beyonddispute...that[Title
VI] prohibits only intentional discrimination,” 36 the four dissenters thought that the
disparate impact “regulations are inspired by, at the service of, and inseparably
intertwinedwith [the statute’s] anti -discriminationmandate. Contrary to themajority’s
suggestion,they‘apply’[thestatutory]prohibitionond iscriminationjustassurelyasthe
intentionaldiscriminationregulations.” 37 Myconcernhereisnotwithwhohasthebetter
oftheargument, 38butwiththe fact thattheargumentpersistsinnearlyallofitsintensity
once one moves from the general conc ept of equal protection to the supposedly more
determinateconceptionofanti -discrimination.
B. AffirmativeAction
The same broad point applies as well to the question of whether race -based
affirmativeactionislegal.Heretoo,thedisagreementpersis tsevenafteronemovesfrom
equalprotectiontoanti -discrimination.
32 42U.S.C.§2000d.
33
121S.Ct.1511(2001).
34
28C.F.R.§104(b)(2)(1999).
35
SeeAlexanderv.Sandoval,121S.Ct.1511,1518 -23(2001).
36
Id. at1516.
37
Id.at1531(Stevens,J.,dissenting).
38 Proponents of treating disparate impact as by itself constitutionally objectionable seldom
address the question whether a policy’s disparate impact voids the policy in toto  or only for
members of the dis advantaged group.  Consider, for example, Test 21, the civil service
examinationus edby theWashington,D.C.policeforce andchallenged in Washingtonv.Davis ,
426 U.S. 229, 234-35 (1976) .  Test 21  had a disparate racial impact on African -Americans.
Under a disparate impact regime, could the test nonetheless be used in screening white
applicants? Doingsowould createan explicit racialclassification,inwhichwhiteapplicantstake
Test21butAfrican -Americansarescreened bysomeothermechanism.  If  thatisunacceptable,
doesthismeanthatanunsuccessfulwhiteapplicantshouldhavestandingtochallengetheuseof
Test21onthegroundsthatithasadisparate impactonAfrican -Americans? Foradiscussionof
thiskindofstandinginquiry in equal protectioncases ,seeMichaelC.Dorf,FacialChallengesto
State and Federal Statutes, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 235, 251-61 (1994); Michael C. Dorf, The
HeterogeneityofRights, 6LegalTheory269, 278(2000).
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Consideranother federal statutoryprovision that is expresslywordedas ananti -
discrimination principle.  TitleVII of theCivilRightsAct of 1964 instructs employers
not“to failor refuse tohireor todischargeany individual,orotherwise todiscriminate
againstany individualwithrespect tohiscompensation, terms,conditions,orprivileges
of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.”39 Aparallelprovisionappliestheidenticalprincipleto jobtrainingprograms. 40
Nonetheless,in UnitedSteelworkersv.Weber ,41theSupremeCourtruled,5 -2,thatTitle
VIIdoesnotprohibitanemployer’svoluntaryeffortstoredressaracialimbalanc einits
workforcebygivingahiringpreferencetoAfrican -Americanapplicantsforanon -the-job
training program. 42  AlthoughChief JusticeBurger and then -JusticeRehnquist thought
this result impossible to square with the express anti -discrimination lan guage of the
Act,43themajorityhadnodifficultyfinding,basedonthestatute’slegislativehistoryand
the context inwhich it arose, that this law forbidding racialdiscriminationpermitted at
leastsomeformsofaffirmativeaction. 44
Scholarshavelong debatedwhethertheCourtcorrectlycharacterizedCongress’s
purpose in enacting Title VII, and if so, whether that should have been dispositive in
Weber.45 Aswithourdisparateimpactexample,sohere, Iamnotnowmuchinterested
in the right answer as  such.  Rather, my point is that the debate over the validity of
affirmativeactionisnotresolvedbyconstruingequalprotectionasananti -discrimination
principle. Mostof thosewhoreadanti -discrimination languageascategoricallybarring
affirmativeactionalsoreadthelanguageoftheEqualProtectionClauseashavingexactly
thesameeffect. 46 Andby thesame token,as Weber shows, thoseJusticesandscholars
whofindthewords“equalprotection”malleableenoughtopermitsomepreferencesfor
membersoftraditionallydisadvantagedgroupstypicallyreachthesameconclusionwhen
interpretingstatutoryanti -discriminationprovisions.
Tobe sure, theactualdecision in Weber  conceded thata “literal” readingof the
anti- discrimination norm would forb id race -based affirmative action, but rejected that
39
42U.S.C.§2000e -2(a)(1).
40
See42U.S.C.§2000e -2(d) (“It shallbeanunlawfulemploymentpractice foranyemployer,
labor organization, or joint labor -management committee controlling apprenticeship or other
training or retraining, including on -the-job training programs to discriminate against any
individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in admission to, or
employmentin,anyprogramestablishedtoprovideapprenticeshiporothertraining.”)
41
443U.S.193(1979).
42
Theparticularprogramatissuein Weber wasjointlyadm inisteredbyanemployerandaunion.
Seeid.at197.
43
Seeid.at216(Burger,C.J.,dissenting);id.at220(Rehnquist,J.,dissenting).
44
Seeid.at202 -08(opinionoftheCourt).
45
 See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin , AMatter Of Principle 316 -31 (1985);Willia mN. Eskridge, Jr.,
DynamicStatutoryInterpretation14 -47,80,135,173,303 -06(1994);PhilipP.Frickey,Fromthe
BigSleep to theBigHeat:TheRevivalofTheory inStatutory Interpretation,77Minn.L.Rev.
241, 245 -57 (1992) (describing Weber  as the catalyst for theories that defend it, like those of
DworkinandEskridge,aswellaspublicchoicetheory,whichattacksit).
46
 For example, JusticeScalia, concurring inAdarandConstructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515U.S. 200
(1995),laidemphasisonthefactth attheEqualProtectionClauseappliesto“anyperson.”  See
id.at239(Scalia,J.,concurringinpartandconcurringinthejudgment).
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readingbasedonthestatute’spurposeandspirit. 47Yettheconcessionwasnotobviously
necessary.  One could plausibly argue that where a program of affirmative action is
sufficientlyjustified,thed enialofsomeopportunitytonon -minorityapplicantsisnot,in
theend, onthebasisofrace (orwhatevertheforbiddencharacteristicis),butisinstead,
on thebasisofwhatever reason justifies the affirmative actionprogram. Alternatively,
one might  think that as used in the statute and every -day language, the word
“discriminate” means “invidiously discriminate,” so that distinctions drawn to benefit
traditionally disadvantaged groups fall outside its ambit. 48  Whether one finds such
argumentspersuas iveis likelytohavemuchlesstodowithone’sviewsaboutlanguage
thanaboutthemoralandpracticalimplicationsofaffirmativeaction.
Still, it could be objected, it is at least a little bit easier  to uphold affirmative
action under the group -disadvantage principle than under the anti -discrimination
principle.  Butthisobjectionisperfectlyambiguouswithrespecttothequestion:easier
for whom?  Once we acknowledge the substantial flexibility inherent in concepts like
group-disadvantageandanti -discrimination, tosaynothingof theflexibilityof themore
generalequalprotectionnorm,itishardtoimaginethattheseconcepts –ratherthanfirst -
ordermoralintuitions,pragmaticjudgments,andthelike –aregoingtodomuchwork.
Moreover,eve nifwegrantthatgroup -disadvantagemakesitsomewhateasierto
reachsomenormativelydesirableresultsthananti -discrimination,itdoesnotfollowthat
group-disadvantageisthebetterinterpretation,forbythesametoken,group -disadvantage
willmak eitsomewhathardertoreachothernormativelydesirableresults.
Consider the intuition that discrimination againstwhites on the basis of race or
discriminationagainstmenonthebasisofsex, ifnotquiteasharmfulasdiscrimination
against African -Americans and women, nonetheless poses a more substantial
constitutionalproblemthandiscriminationagainstpeoplewhorentratherthanowntheir
homes49 or against people who drive red cars. 50  This intuition is widely shared.   For
example,eventhoseJusti ceswhohavebeensympathetictorace -consciousmeasuresthat
aimtoassistmembersof traditionallysubordinatedgroupshaveadvocated intermediate
scrutiny of suchmeasures, rather thanmere rationality review. 51 Yet, by contrastwith
the anti -discrimination principle, the group -disadvantage principle has difficulty
vindicatingtheintuitionthatthereisalwayssomethingatleastalittleproblematicabout
theuseofcertaincriterialikeraceorsex,eveniftheyarenotbeingusedtodisadvantage
asub ordinatedgroup.
Fisscomplainedthatundertheanti -discriminationprinciple,“thepermissibilityof
preferential treatment[forblacksand,byextenstion,otherdisadvantagedgroups]is tied
47
See443U.S.at201(citing HolyTrinityChurch v. UnitedStates ,143U.S.457,459(1892)).
48
SeeRonaldDworkin ,A MatterofPrinciple318(1985) (explaininghow “discriminate”canbe
used evaluatively as well as descriptively ; William N. Eskridge, Jr. , Dynamic Statutory
Interpretation,135U.Pa.L.Rev.1479,1489 -90(1987) (same) .
49
SeeI.R.C.§163(h)(3)(permitti ngdeductionforinterestonahomemortgage).
50 Ihaveheardclaimsthatthisisarealphenomenon,a lthoughIhavebeenunabletodiscoverany
reliableempiricalstudy.  Cf. GaryJacobs,CopsDrivingMeRoundtheBend,TheMirror(UK),
Jan.22,1997,at6(claimingthat policestopdriversofredcars and“heaps” mostoften) .
51 See RegentsofUniversity ofCalifornia v.Bakke, 438U.S. 265, 355-63 (1978) ( Brennan, J,
joinedby White,MarshallandBlackmun, JJ.,concurringinpart and dissentinginpart) .
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tothepermissibilityofhostiletreatmentagainstblacks[and othersuchgroups].” 52 This
isafaircomplaintagainstcolor -blindnessinitsmostextremeform,butnotagainstanti -
discrimination, nor even against a doctrinal structure that subjects all uses of some
suspectclassificationtothesamelevelofscrutin y.Ananti -discriminationprincipledoes
not say thatwhites andblacks,menandwomen,orheterosexuals andhomosexuals are
identically situated. What it does say “is that the government’s use of race [or sex or
sexualorientation]isfrequentlyinconsi stentwithnotionsofhumandignity,” 53 inaway
that the use of other classifications – like owning versus renting or the color of one’s
automobile– isnot.
C. TheSectionFivePower
As Fiss himself acknowledged, a judicial understanding of equal protec tion in
eventhemostnarrowlyformalistanti -discriminationtermsisperfectlyconsistentwitha
broader Congressional understanding pursuant to Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment.  Groupsand theEqualProtectionClause argued thateven ifonewere  to
accepttheanti -discriminationprincipleoverthegroup -disadvantageprincipleasamatter
of judicial doctrine, such a decision should not bind Congress, because the principal
virtueoftheanti -discriminationprincipleisitseaseofadministrationb yjudges,andthat
factorhasnobearingonCongress’sjudgment. 54Congressgetsitswarrantforactionfrom
thePeople,notfromitswillingnesstoconformitsdecisionstoformalbarriers,andthus
should be free to go beyond the Court’s extrapolation fro m constitutional text. 55
Althougha5 -4majorityoftheSupremeCourtrejectsthislogic,theCourt’sargumentis
based in principles of federalism, rather than the entailments of the anti -discrimination
principle.
***
Accordingly,ananti -discriminationprinciplecan,withoutunduedistortion: lead
to close scrutiny of laws that have a disparate impact on a racial minority; validate
affirmative action; and co -exist with a broader Congressional understanding of the
FourteenthAmendmentthantheoneendo rsedbytheSupremeCourt.
III. Anti-DiscriminationandMeans -EndsScrutiny
If the anti -discrimination principle can rather handily produce the results Fiss
sought,whywashesoeagertocriticizeit?Theanswer,Ithink,isthatdespitenominally
targeting“theanti -discriminationprinciple,”therealfocusofcriticismin Groupsandthe
Equal Protection Clause  was a peculiar version of the anti -discrimination principle,
namely,means/ends scrutiny of the sort described in the Venn diagrams of the class ic
articlebyTussmanandtenBroek. 56
52
Fiss,supranote 11,at129.
53
 Peter J. Rubin, Reconnecting Doctrine and Purpose: A Comprehensive Approach to Strict
ScrutinyafterAdarandandShaw,149U.Pa.L.Rev.1,18 -19(2000).
54
Seeid. at175 -76.
55
SeeBoardofTrusteesoftheUniv.ofAlabamav.Garrett,531U.S.356,121S.Ct.955,972 -74
(2001)(Breyer,J.,dissenting).
56 See Joseph Tussman&JacobustenBroek,The EqualProtection of theLaws,37Cal.L.Rev.
341,341(1949)
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Means-ends rationality, Fiss argued, was the core of the anti -discrimination
principle;57 yet means -ends rationality could not, absent elaborate mental gymnastics,
identifythosepoliciesthatoffendedtheequalitynorm .Tomakethepoint,Fissborrowed
an example from Paul Brest: “How should a court treat a [public] school principal’s
decision,basedsolelyonaesthetics,tohaveblackandwhitestudentssitonoppositesides
ofthestageatthegraduationceremony?” 58 Fissthoughtitobviousthatsuchadecision
wouldviolatetheEqualProtectionClausebutthattheanti -discriminationprinciplecould
not easily reach this conclusion because the school principal’s chosen means are
extremelywellsuitedtotheend. 59
The criticism is indeed telling, but only against a feeble version of the anti -
discriminationprinciple.  It is alwayspossible toconcoct some end that anychallenged
policy fitsperfectly,especially ifaestheticscountsasapermissibleend. There is,aft er
all,noaccountingfortaste.Ifaestheticsjustifiesracialsegregationonagraduationstage,
itwouldalso justify racialsegregationonaschool -by-schoolbasis: thepatternofblack
andwhitechildrenwalkingtotheirrespectiveseparateschoolsm aybemorepleasingto
observers – purely as a matter of aesthetics, mind you – than the chaotic pattern that
resultsfromintegratedschools.Yetsucharesultismanifestlyabsurd.
In the foregoing examples, we might readily say that “aesthetics” is an
impermissible justification for treating people differently on the basis of race.  That
judgmentseemseasyenoughgiventhatanaesthetictasteforseeingchildrenseparatedon
the basis of race is likely to be related to other,more pernicious, attitude s about race.
More broadly, these examples show that any plausible account ofmeans/ends scrutiny
must includesomespecificationofwhatendsarepermissible. Tohaveanyteethatall,
means/endsscrutinycannotbeaboutfitalone.
Current equal protect ion doctrine recognizes this point by askingwhether racial
classificationsarenarrowlytailoredtoserve compelling interests. What is this ifnotan
inquiry into whether the ends served by a racial or other presumptively invalid
classificationaresuff icientlyweightytojustifytheclassification?
Toseetherolethatendsscrutinyplaysincurrentdoctrine,itisworthaskingwhat
goalheightenedscrutinyserves. Ononeaccount,thecompellinginterest testissolelya
meansfordistinguishinglegiti matefromillegitimatepurposes.  Ifachallengedpolicyis
not narrowly tailored to advance a compelling interest, courts assume that it serves an
invalid purpose, such as racial or gender subordination, and strike it down.   There is
considerablesupport inthecaselawforunderstandingthecompellinginteresttestinthis
way.60
However, the compelling interest test is over -inclusive as a mechanism for
discovering illicit purpose.  Suppose that a fire department hires only men.  One
explanationforsuch apolicy,perhapsthemostlikely,isillicitsex -stereotyping.Yet,the
57
Fiss, supranote 11,at111.
58
 Id. at 116 (quoting Paul Brest, Processes of Constitutional Decisionmaking 489 (1975))
(internalquotationmarksomitted).
59
Fiss,supranote 11,at112.
60 See Richmondv.J. A.CrosonCo.,488U.S.469 ,493 (1989) (“[T]hepurposeofstrict scrutiny
is to ‘smoke out’ illicit uses of race by assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal
importantenoughtowarrantuseofahighlys uspecttool. ”); seegenerally Rubenfeld, supranote
10,at 432-44.
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compelling interest testwillcondemnthepolicyeven ifuncontrovertedevidenceshows
thatnosexistthoughtsenteredthemindsofthefiredepartment’spolicymakers. Imagine
that thesepolicymakerstestifythattheirsolemotivationwasfinancial;theyacknowledge
that therearesomewomenwhocouldsatisfyastrengthrequirement that theysincerely
believetobeessentialfordoingthejob,buttheyclaimfurtherthatthereareno tenough
such women to justify the screening costs.  Even if the court believes each of these
claims, the compelling interest test would condemn the blanket exclusion of women
applicants.  The fact that a generalization based on a presumptively invalid cri terion
happens tobe trueasastatisticalmatterdoesnot justify thecriterion’suse inparticular
cases.61
The over -inclusiveness of the compelling interest test could be explained in
prophylactic terms.  The real  targets of the Equal ProtectionClause, on this view, are
actionsthatreflectillicitmotive,butbecauseofthedifficultyofprovingmotive,thelaw
presumesthataracialorotherproscribedclassificationthatcannotsatisfystrictscrutiny
wasadoptedoremployedbecauseofanillicitmoti ve.62
Alternatively, one can understand the compelling interest test as a limit on
ordinarycost -benefitanalysis.  In thisview, the lawpermitssomeuseofpresumptively
invalidclassifications,but,becauseofthedangersofsuchclassifications,itdoes soonly
when the benefits very clearly outweigh the costs. 63  This accountmakes sense of the
intuition that in the fire department examplewewould not permit sex to be used as a
proxyforstrengthevenifweignoredtheproblemsofprovingmotive.
Idon otattempttoresolvethequestionwhetherthecompellinginteresttestisbest
understood as simply about discerning illegitimate purposes or also includes a cost -
benefit component.  I do note, however, that either understanding requires that courts
distinguishamongdifferentsortsofends.Theycannotsimplyinquirewhetherthemeans
fitwhateverendsthegovernmentchoosestopursue.
Thatthereissomeweighingofendsunderthecost -benefitviewofthecompelling
interesttestseemsobviousenough,bu tevenundertheprophylacticview,endsanalysisis
necessary.  Ends analysis is needed to sort sham from real purposes, because of the
possibility of articulating some purpose to which any policy is narrowly tailored.  To
return to Brest’s example, aesth etics cannot ordinarily count as a compelling interest
because of the substantial risk that aesthetic judgments reflect or disguise illicit
judgmentsofothersorts.
Thus,evenasdebatecontinuesaboutthejustificationfor thecompelling interest
test, there is no doubt that it includes some weighing of ends.  Fiss’s critique – in
targeting a version of the anti -discrimination principle that focuses solely on fit – does
61 See, e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 645 ( 1975) (finding unconstitutional a
provision of the Social SecurityAct that limited payments to survivors of deceasedwives and
mothers but not fathers and husbands even though “the notion th at men are more likely than
women to be the primary supporters of their spouses and children is not without empirical
support.”).
62
SeeDavidA.Strauss,TheUbiquityofProphylacticRules,55U.Chi.L.Rev.190,204(1988).
63
See,e.g.,ErwinChemeri nsky,ConstitutionalScholarshipinthe1990s,45HastingsL.J.1105,
1117 (1994) (reviewing Public Values in Constitutional Law (Stephen E. Gottlieb ed., 1993))
(“The determination ofwhether there is a sufficiently compelling interest to override a right  is
inherentlyaboutbalancing.”)
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notapplytomodernanti -discriminationlaw. Morebroadly,whetherornot Groupsan d
the Equal Protection Clause fairly characterized the anti -discrimination principle in
1976, the intervening years have shown that a framework of anti -discrimination can
indeedaccommodatetheanti -subordinationconcernsthatmovedFiss.
Consider,inthis regard,oneofthemostcontentiousquestionsinequalprotection
doctrine:whatsortsofinterestsaresufficientlyweightytojustifyrace -basedaffirmative
action, and under what circumstances?  Justice Powell’s opinion announcing the
judgment of the C ourt in Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke ,64 stated that “the
interestofdiversityiscompellinginthecontextofauniversity’sadmissionsprogram.” 65
Whetherthatviewreflectscurrentlawisanopenquestion. 66
Fiss was right, of course, that me ans/ends analysis cannot tell us whether an
interest such as diversity is compelling, 67 butwrong, I think, to conclude that the anti -
discrimination principle is deficient as a consequence. Constitutional doctrine is rarely
self-applying.  Nonetheless, a d octrine that asks for especially strong justifications for
somekindsofactionprovidesrealifnotcompleteguidancetodecisionmakers.  Or,to
put the point in a way that emphasizes that an anti -discrimination principle can leave
room for Fiss’s group -disadvantage principle, the fact that a challenged race -conscious
governmentmeasurebenefitsmembersofatraditionallyandstilloppressedgroupshould
berelevanttothequestionwhetherthemeasureservesacompellinginterest. Thegroup
perspective enters intotheanalysisonthecompellinginterestsideof theledger.  Inmy
view, thisdoesnot requireus to “stretch and strain” the anti -discriminationprinciple, 68
butonlytofleshitout.
IV. Conclusion
Viewed from one perspective, Groups and the  Equal Protection Clause is a
period piece, a relic of amore egalitarian but bygone era.  Constitutional doctrine has
rejected each of the central features of Fiss’s group -disadvantage principle: facially
neutrallawsburdeningsubordinatedgroupsreceive noheightenedjudicialscrutiny;race -
conscious government action that benefits such groups is presumptively invalid; and
Congresshasnosubstantivepowertoexpandthejudicialprotectionsforequality.
Yet, even as the Supreme Court has embraced forma l equality at nearly every
turn, the last quarter century has witnessed an expansion in the coverage of anti -
discrimination norms.  Statutory prohibitions on age, disability, and sexual orientation
discriminationhavebeenenacted. Andalthoughthepathr emainsrocky,eventheCourt
64
438U.S.265(1978).
65
Id.at314(opinionofPowell,J.)
66 Compare Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944 (1996) (finding that Justice Powell’s Bakke
opinion is not binding precedent on the question whether diversity is a c ompelling interest in
university admissions) with Hopwood v. Texas, 85 F.3d 720, 723 -24 (5th Cir. 1996) (Politz,
Chief Judge, joined by King,Wiener, Benavides, Stewart, Parker, andDennis, Circuit Judges,
dissenting from the denial of en banc review) (arg uing that Justice Powell’s Bakke  opinion is
controlling).SeealsoJohnsonv.Bd.ofRegentsof Univ.ofGeorgia, 263F.3d 1234, 1244(11th
Cir.2001) (“Weneednot,anddonot,resolveinthisopinionwhetherstudentbody diversityever
may be a compell ing interest supporting a university's consideration of race in its admissions
process.”)
67
SeeFiss,supranote 11,at135 -36.
68
Id.at171.
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has broadened the scope of its proscription on sex stereotyping, 69while admitting gays
and lesbians into the circle of protected persons. 70  Especially in United States v.
Virginia71  and Romerv.Evans ,72 theCourt’swillingness t o see the realityof exclusion
forbonafidesocialgroupsreflectsanunderstandingoftheEqualProtectionClausethat
is both an interpretation of the anti -discrimination principle and, at bottom, consistent
withtheunderstandingProfessorFissurgedi n1976. AlthoughFissdidnotthinkso,the
anti- discrimination principle is broad enough to do much of the important egalitarian
workthathesoarticulatelychampionedin GroupsandtheEqualProtectionClause .
69 In UnitedStatesv.Virginia ,518U.S.515(1996),theCourtappearedtoapplysomethinglike
strict scrutiny to a sex classification, requiring an “exceedingly persua sive justification” for the
VirginiaMilitary Institute’s all -male studentbody.  See id. at531. However, theCourt’smost
recentsexdiscriminationdecision, Nguyenv. INS,121S.Ct.2053(2001),isconsiderablymore
deferentialtothegovernment.  Seealso PriceWaterhouse v.Hopkins, 490U.S.228 ,25 0(1989)
(“Inthespecificcontextofsexstereotyping,anemployerwhoactsonthebasisofabeliefthata
womancannotbeaggressive,orthatshemustnotbe,hasactedonthebasisofgender. ”).
70
SeeRomerv.Evans ,517U.S.620 ,635- 36(1996) .
71
518U.S.515(1996).
72
517U.S.620(1996).
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